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Glitch    Sean  Cubitt,  Goldsmiths,  University  of  London    Cultural  Politics  13(1),  March  2017    Abstract  Glitches,  formally  artifacts  of  errors  in  electronic  transmission  like  CD  stutters  or  dead  pixels,  interrupt  communication  and  distract  audiences  without  wrecking  the  systems  they  occur  in.  Permanent  irritants,  they  operate  as  irruptions  of  difference  into  the  indifferent  flux  of  commodity  exchange.  They  reveal  the  exclusions,  notably  of  noise,  that  enable  rational  communication,  and  the  underpinning  dependence  of  ostensibly  unique  items  in  semantic  chains  on  their  mutual  indifference.  Glitches  are  symbols  whose  non-­‐human  labor  reveals  the  limits  of  humanism.    Keywords:  Glitch,  media,  technology,  labor    Contributor  Sean  Cubitt  is  Professor  of  Film  and  Television  at  Goldsmiths,  University  of  London  and  Honorary  Professorial  Fellow  at  the  University  of  Melbourne.  His  most  recent  books  are  The  Practice  of  Light:  A  Genealogy  of  Visual  Technologies  (2014)  and  Finite  Media:  Environmental  Implications  of  Digital  Technologies  (2016).  He  is  the  series  editor  for  Leonardo  Books  at  MIT  Press.  
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Glitch  Sean  Cubitt,  Goldsmiths,  University  of  London    The  word  'glitch'  refers  to  any  form  of  electronic  interference,  especially  those  that  become  audible  or  visible  in  transmission.  According  to  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary,  the  word  appeared  for  the  first  time  in  the  1960s  as  astronaut  slang  for  a  sudden  surge  in  current.  Electro-­‐magnetic  media  have  always  been  susceptible  to  electric  pulses  and  magnetic  fields,  often  coming  from  the  equipment  they  have  been  produced,  stored  or  played  back  on:  the  term  swiftly  permeated  the  world  of  electronic  as  well  as  electrical  engineering  so  thoroughly  that  now,  in  everyday  English,  a  'glitch'  is  any  accident  that  is  trivial  enough  to  be  overcome.  A  glitch  in  any  kind  of  system  creates  minor  disturbances  without  actually  damaging  its  major  functioning.  Glitches  do  not  stop  transmission:  they  merely  make  it  scrappy,  dirty  or  noisy.  In  media,  the  word  can  be  used  in  both  digital  and  analogue  electronic  media,  and  by  extension  to  describe  dust  and  scratches  on  a  film,  stains  on  a  cinema  screen,  or  an  imperfection  in  a  lens.  Most  writing  on  glitches  comes  from  electronic  engineers  seeking  ways  to  remedy  them.  Many  artists,  among  them  noted  net.artists  Jodi  and  glitch  artist  Rosa  Menkmann,  quite  to  the  contrary,  have  embraced  glitches  to  create  new  visual  and  sonic  forms  from  electronic  media's  capacity  for  creating  and  navigating  their  way  past  interruptions  in  their  material  substrates.     Given  its  first  usage,  the  word  'glitch'  should  properly  be  limited  to  electronics.  However,  it  can  be  heard  in  post-­‐1960s  discussions  of  the  technical  media  that  arrived  in  the  19th  century  –  photography,  telegraphy,  cinema  –  and  to  earlier  printing  and  printmaking  technologies.  Its  modernity  is  key  to  its  function.  Perfection  had  certain  qualities  in  earlier  epochs  that  no  longer  hold  of  modernist  media.  Thus  the  ornamental  friezes  and  ceilings  of  the  great  mosques  always  incorporated  a  single  flaw,  since  perfection  was  God's  prerogative.  At  the  pinnacle  of  mediaeval  Gothic,  the  cathedral  of  Chartres,  built  in  a  single  generation  under  the  guidance  of  a  single  vision,  approximates  that  perfection  which  in  Islamic  architecture  was  blasphemous,  but  for  very  much  the  same  theological  reason.  There  is  then  an  archeology  of  the  imperfection,  but  it  is  in  the  technical  media  that  it  first  emerges  not  as  intention  but  as  artifact  of  the  materiality  of  the  medium.  Ink  bubbles  disturb  the  careful  composition  of  darkness  in  intaglio  printing,  even  after  they  were  drafted  in  as  the  basis  for  later  techniques  like  aquatint.    
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  Glitch  is  the  evidence  that  control  is  never  complete.  Completion,  perfection  and  control  only  go  together  in  this  sealed  triad  under  conditions  of  modernity.  The  glitch  comes  as  a  small  revenge,  a  tactical  revolt  of  the  material  against  its  organization,  of  materiality  against  intent.  Where  control  belongs  to  the  perfection  of  mastery,  glitch  belongs  to  the  decolonial.  As  such,  it  is  at  once  a  material  event  and  a  moment  in  which  the  possession  of  subjectivity  is  in  question.  An  artwork  or  indeed  any  communication  typically  establishes  its  source  as  in  some  way  human,  whether  imaginary,  fictional  or  determinate,  and  whether  posed  as  equal,  as  dependent  or  as  authoritative.  The  glitch  indicates  an  other  subject  in  the  medium,  the  ghost  in  the  machine,  the  inhuman  in  our  communications.  Of  this  subjectivity  Ashis  Nandy  writes  while  the  economic,  political  and  moral  results  of  colonialism  have  been  discussed,  its  emotional  and  cognitive  costs  have  been  ignored.  And  as  Freud  has  reminded  us  in  this  century,  what  we  choose  to  forget  has  a  tendency  to  come  back  and  haunt  us  in  'history'  (Nandy  1983:  71)  One  of  Nandy's  great  insights  into  the  colonial  subject  formation  is  that  while  it  oppresses  the  colonized,  in  the  manner  so  passionately  captured  in  Fanon,  it  represses  the  colonist,  the  key  example  of  whom  in  Nandy's  account  is  Rudyard  Kipling,  condemned  to  repress  'the  other  Orient  .  .  .  as  archetype  and  as  potential'  (Nandy  1983:  71-­‐2),  construing  Asia  as  orient  precisely  in  order  to  identify,  externalize,  and  demean  the  otherwise  universal  possibilities  of  a  polytheistic,  multicultural  androgyny.  In  order  to  produce  the  ordered,  unified,  commanding  persona  of  colonial  rulers,  Kipling  and  his  peers  learned  to  submerge  themselves.      Nandy's  appeal  to  Freudian  repression  is  no  longer  fashionable,  it  is  tempting  to  suggest,  because  the  neo-­‐liberal  subject  that  has  supplanted  both  colonial  and  anti-­‐colonial  subjects,  the  latter  as  Nandy  argues  formed  in  the  mirror  of  the  former,  can  now  claim  a  universality  only  in  preparation  under  the  British  Raj.  That  universality,  whose  intellectual  roots  lie  in  the  German  idealist  tradition  which  gave  to  modernity  as  reason  and  freedom  its  greatest  expression,  and  in  which  the  suppression  of  individuality  under  the  sign  of  the  universal  subject  found  its  most  sweeping  and  profound  expression,  denies  the  possibility  of  internal  contradiction,  let  alone  rupture  and  failure.  For  Freud,  subjectivity  is  an  always  incomplete  project.      Contrast,  some  hundred  years  earlier,  Hegel's  thesis  of  'the  cunning  of  Reason  –  that  it  sets  the  
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passions  to  work  for  itself,  while  that  through  which  it  develops  itself  pays  the  penalty  and  suffers  the  loss'  (Hegel  1953:  44).  The  'that  through  which  it  develops  itself'  is  of  course  human  lives.  Each  of  us  suffers  and  dies,  so  that  Reason  can  pursue  its  own  self-­‐development.  Each  of  us  must  feel  our  passions  set  aflame  so  that  cool  Reason  can  motor  calmly  into  its  future.  We  individuals  will  be  consumed,  and  the  future  will  not  come  back  to  rescue  or  justify  our  sad  existence,  save  as  necessary  sacrifice  in  which  even  our  virtues  played  no  more  part  than  cogs  in  clockwork.  If  Hegel  was  the  scientist  of  this  modern  subject,  the  English  public  schools  were  its  laboratory,  and  the  Raj  its  application.  Today  we  witness  its  democratization,  as  the  instrumental  rationality  of  perfectly  informed  purchasers  in  a  perfectly  equitable  exchange  constituting  a  universal  Subject  of  history  in  the  Market  whose  self-­‐sufficient  Reason  trumps  all  individual  misery.    The  Market  as  pure  Reason  depends  upon  perfect  communication.  Financialization,  which  no  longer  requires  material  grounds  but  only  faith  in  their  indefinitely  postponed  existence  (the  'confidence'  of  investors),  reveals  the  increasingly  communicative  nature  of  the  economy.  The  Subject  of  market  communication  is  however  not  the  investors  but  the  Market  itself:  investor  confidence  is  a  mere  semantic  epiphenomenon,  just  as  individual  investors'  losses  and  gains  are  evened  out  in  the  cunning  of  the  Market.  The  'emotional  and  cognitive  costs'  of  marketisation  have  not  been  entirely  ignored,  as  under  colonialism,  because  they  are  now  operationalized  as  raw  materials  for  the  reproduction  of  a  capital  which,  having  completed  its  geographical  expansion,  now  expands  to  colonize  the  minds  and  bodies  of  its  inhabitants.  Whether  as  consumers  of  therapies  and  pharmaceuticals,  or  as  the  necessarily  damaged  creatives  who  feed  the  maw  of  fashion,  the  production  of  unhappiness  is  as  integral  to  the  reproduction  of  capital  as  is  the  production  of  waste.    In  such  perfect  communication,  reversing  the  belief  of  the  Islamic  architects,  any  interruption  is  blasphemy.  Where  the  world  is  constituted  as  the  self-­‐realization  of  the  Market,  any  other  goal,  desire,  tendency  or  indeed  any  accident  to  the  contrary  is  not  only  illicit  but  both  shameful  and  doomed  to  failure,  since  no  other  can  exist  that  is  not  the  perfection  of  the  Market.  In  the  grand  sum  of  things,  this  hideous  dogma  is  the  reason  why  one  should  undertake  to  follow  the  affordances  of  glitch  aesthetics,  for  in  the  glitch  there  emerges  what  from  the  point  of  view  of  this  now  dominant  Subject  of  history  must  be  that  unthinkable  thing,  evidence  of  an  other.  What  is  so  deeply  blasphemous  about  this  evidence  is  that  where  there  
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is  even  one  in  excess  of  The  One,  there  is  no  way  to  stop  the  proliferation  of  others.  The  pure  unity  of  perfect  communication  demands,  therefore,  its  unconscious.  The  unconscious  of  perfect  communication  is  the  glitch.    No-­‐one  should  however  therefore  embrace  the  unconscious  as  a  good  in  and  of  itself.  It  is  a  symptom  of  repression,  and  to  that  extent  determined  by  the  existence  of  unity.  Glitch  aesthetics  is  only  the  verso  of  a  perfect  recto,  the  obverse  of  the  One.  Its  evidence  is  of  unhappiness,  that  which  'pays  the  penalty  and  suffers  the  loss'.      At  the  same  time,  the  existence  of  a  multiplicity  parallel  to  the  unity  of  the  Market,  a  multiplicity  not  reducible  to  its  singular  density,  proposes  itself  as  noise,  opposed  to  the  negentropic  signal  of  smoothly-­‐running  communicative  perfection.  We  may  think  of  this  noise  as  the  primal  mediation  from  which  communication  must  bootstrap  itself.  Electromagnetic  noise  fills  the  radio  spectrum,  with  everything  from  cosmic  radiation's  echoes  of  the  Big  Bang  to  the  ephemeral  crackle  of  lightning.  As  Douglas  Kahn  (2013:  1)  asserts,  'Radio  existed  long  before  it  was  invented'.  The  communicational  function  of  radio  depended  on  the  prior  existence  of  uncontrolled  static,  whistlers  and  other  phenomena  of  the  radio  spectrum  before  human  broadcasts.  We  may  therefore  understand  glitches  as  epiphenomena  of  the  material  substrate  of  electronic  transmission,  and  by  extension  understand  the  priority  of  dust,  for  example,  over  film  that  struggles  so  hard  to  exclude  it,  and  encourages  its  audiences  to  ignore  it  when  it  does  appear.  Glitch,  in  this  perspective  belongs  to  the  pre-­‐human,  inhuman  universe  against  which  we  drag  our  messages  into  existence,  and  against  which  we  strive  to  retain  their  integrity.  This  noise  can  then  be  seen  both  as  primeval  nature  and  as  the  entropy  that  threatens  every  act  of  order,  every  emergence  of  life,  insofar  as  life  is  negentropic,  striving  against  chaos,  gathering  materials  and  energy  to  protect  itself  from  dissolution.  This  certainly  was  the  standpoint  of  the  first  cyberneticists  like  John  von  Neuman.  At  the  same  time,  as  Michel  Serres  (1982)  argues,  without  this  ground  of  random  and  non-­‐human  a-­‐signifying,  signification  itself  cannot  take  place.  Not  simply  a  raw  material  transformed  into  communication,  Serres'  noisy  'parasite'  is  no  leach  sucking  the  life  of  order,  but  the  fabric  on  which  meaning  embroiders  its  patterns.  As  Mary  Douglas  argues,  order  gives  the  world  meaning  by  giving  it  structure:  As  we  know  it,  dirt  is  essentially  disorder.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  absolute  dirt:  it  exists  in  the  eye  of  the  beholder  .  .  .  Dirt  offends  against  
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order.  Eliminating  it  is  not  a  negative  movement,  but  a  positive  effort  to  organise  the  environment  (Douglas  1966:  2).  Meaning  constructs  itself  by  distinguishing  itself  from  the  dirty,  noisy  world  around  it,  which  it  ejects  as  mere  environs,  mere  externality.  This  process  is  curiously  doubled.  In  a  first  movement,  as  Elinor  Carmi  argues,  the  cybernetic  efficiencies  set  out  in  Bell  Telephone's  post  WWII  move  to  automated  switchboards  'was  achieved  by  disciplining  and  managing  women  and  then  driving  them  out  of  the  workforce.  Their  noise  became  silenced  by  automatic  machines'  (Carmi  2015:  11).  Yet  as  she  also  argues,  the  ejection  of  noisy  women  from  the  circuit  was  preceded  by  the  integration  of  their  bodies  into  it,  under  hybrid  Taylorist-­‐biopolitical  regimes  mixing  internalized  discipline  with  the  integration  of  switchboard  operators'  bodies  into  the  operation  of  the  system.  Like  the  'natural'  environment,  economic  externalities  are  presumed  by  the  system  that  exploits  them  while  at  the  same  time  excluded  from  the  accounts,  fiscal  and  descriptive,  the  system  gives  of  itself.  Thus  noise  as  primal  asignifying  material  is  both  subsumed  and  rendered  of  no  account.      Glitches  therefore  need  to  be  acknowledged  as  liminal  events,  thresholds  between  internal  and  external,  like  the  women's  bodies  first  disciplined  and  then  ejected,  only  because  they  had  by  then  been  assimilated,  as  operational  procedures,  into  the  functioning  of  an  asexual  and  to  that  extent  presumedly  noiseless  operation.  The  glitch  then  is  not  so  much  the  repressed  of  gender  as  it  is  the  emergence  of  a  polysexuality  doubly  excluded,  first  by  the  construction  of  femininity  and  then  by  its  neutering.  More  damaging  still,  this  polymorphous  perversity  is  no  longer  even  identifiable  as  infantile:  it  is  instead  primordial,  not  chronologically  but  pervasively:  the  irreducible  accompaniment  to  the  production  of  communicative  order.      Noise  thus  emerges  as  historical  concept  at  the  end  of  a  social  formation  that  knew  only  sound,  by  which  I  mean  sonic  material  that  was  ultimately  semantic.  Prior  to  the  development  of  large-­‐scale  machinery,  sound  was  indeed,  as  Christian  Metz  (1980)  had  it  of  cinematic  'aural  objects',  the  sound  of  something:  the  mediaeval  soundscape  was  composed  of  human  activities,  animals,  trees  and  rivers,  meteorological  and,  more  rarely,  geological  events.  The  harmonies  of  nature  or  discords  of  war,  the  calls  of  the  spirit  or  of  sovereigns  formed  the  sonic  without  a  concept  of  noise,  which  had  to  be  invented  as  a  category  of  thought  and  hearing.  Thus  primordial  noise  is  also  a  historical  discovery,  a  new  way  to  categorize  
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experience,  and  a  new  ontology  which,  however,  makes  possible  the  thought  of  a  non-­‐human,  unexperienced  reality  that  has  always  been  there,  but  never  before  sensed  or  named.  The  semantic  universe  of  the  Middle  Ages,  even  at  its  most  dogmatic,  was  always  open  to  miracles,  the  unassimilable  new.  Primordial  mediation  only  begins  to  be  heard  as  noise  in  the  arithmetic  configuration  of  scientific  rationalism  after  Galileo.    Observing  that  'Modern  scientific  technologies  tend  to  work  toward  eliminating  accidents',  Masakai  Fujihata  (2014)  has  written  that  'Complete  control  requires  anticipating  and  preventing  the  unexpected,  thus  precluding  any  element  of  discovery  or  surprise.  But  for  humans  to  remain  creative,  we  cannot  do  without  the  stimuli  of  the  unexpected—which  is  ultimately  what  leads  us  to  scientific  curiosity  in  the  first  place'.  The  programming  of  the  unexpected  is  however  already  contradictory,  since,  as  Manon  and  Temkin  (2011)  point  out,  'from  the  point  of  view  of  the  file,  whose  genetic  predispositions  are  rigid  and  fixed,  there  is  nothing  random  about  glitching.  "Open  57904.jpg  >>  replace  all  Q  with  9hJ"  produces  exactly  the  same  results  every  time.  Alternately,  we  could  say  that  glitch  practice  is  pseudo-­‐aleatory,  since  results  which  appear  random  are  in  fact  entirely  reproducible'.  Noise,  once  discovered,  can  be  generated  as  well  as  revealed.  Thus  the  glitch  operates  both  as  a  proof  of  the  limitations  of  communication  and  at  the  same  time  as  a  quality  of  communication.  In  feature  films,  this  contradiction  appears  as  the  paradoxical  evidence  of  the  truly  mediated  status  of  fictional  interchanges.  In  Tony  Scott's  Déjà  Vu  (2006)  for  example,  glitches  mark  scenes  in  the  'real'  fictional  world  off  from  the  'unreal'  past  that  a  fictitious  medium  allows  the  protagonists  to  view.  Like  the  Adobe  Photoshop  lens  flare  filter,  which  produces  the  illusion  of  a  real  lens  in  an  unreal  image,  glitches  have  become  the  hallmark  of  a  fictional  mediation  within  a  fictional  diegesis.  The  doubling  of  the  mediation  produces  an  effect  of  authenticity,  like  the  mimicking  of  long-­‐lens  camera  snooping  in  Citizen  Kane  (1941)  that  Garret  Stewart  (2007:  51)  refers  to  as  'authentication  by  disrepair',  or  those  ubiquitous  gunsight  and  binocular  masks  in  westerns  and  thrillers.  Here  the  extra  layer  of  mediation  mimics  a  primary  mediation,  part  of  whose  effect  is  to  mask  the  real  primary  mediation:  we  never  notice  the  black  area  surrounding  the  gunsight,  only  the  gunsight  itself.  Other  modes  of  additional  mediation  mimic  subjective  states  (double  printing  for  example)  again  without  encoding  for  reflection  on  the  medium  itself.  Double-­‐printing,  vignettes,  filters  and  self-­‐conscious  mimicry  of  other  genres  are  frequently  deployed  in  avant-­‐garde  film,  but  there  it  is  the  occasion  –  the  event  of  an  avant-­‐garde  screening  –  that  encodes  for  the  reflexive,  quite  as  much  as  the  film  techniques  themselves.    
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  It  may  be  that  to  extend  definitions  of  glitch  backward  to  such  pre-­‐electronic  forms  is  to  defuse  the  specificity  of  the  trope.  Yet  the  accumulation  of  dust  and  scratches  on  showprints  and  even  on  archive  prints  is  in  many  respects  part  of  their  aesthetic.  There  is  a  possibly  apocryphal  tale  of  John  Cage,  who  had  initially  been  scathing  about  Paik's  Zen  for  Film,  comprised  of  clear  blank  leader,  declaring  it  'much  improved'  on  seeing  it  on  its  return  to  New  York  from  a  tour  damaged  by  its  handling  and  projection.  We  imagine  that  Cage  approved  the  evidence  of  existence,  the  specificity  of  this  particular  print  rather  than  any  other,  the  witnessing  of  the  world  far  more  deeply  inscribed  than  any  photographic  image.  In  this  sense  we  can  learn  from  this  moment  in  Fluxus  that  the  electronic  glitch  matters  because  it  is  matter.  Analogue  video  glitches  are  preeminently  artifacts  of  the  machinery  of  recording  and  editing.  They  are  evidence  of  the  handling  of  the  tape,  of  its  physical  passage  through  moments  of  history,  and  in  the  case  of  some  glitches  (comet  tails  from  tube  cameras,  horizontal  marks  traversing  the  image)  marks  of  moments  of  recording  and  of  playback.  Disintegration  of  the  image  is  evidence  of  the  integrity  of  the  tape  itself  as  inhabitant  of  history.      The  deliberate  production  of  glitches  is  perhaps  a  different  matter.  Analog  video  synthesizers  like  the  Rutt-­‐Etra  in  the  hands  of  Woody  and  Steina  Vasulka,  or  the  Image  Processor  built  by  Dan  Sandin  and  Phil  Morton  already  produced  the  kind  of  predictable  glitching  of  video  signals  that  Manon  and  Temkin  are  concerned  about.  This  kind  of  'experimental'  media,  in  which  the  experiments  are  conducted  in  public,  would  include  also  the  slit-­‐scan  technique  developed  by  Douglas  Trumbull  for  2001  (1968)  and  many  effects  undertaken  for  mainstream  film.  They  are  in  this  instance  no  longer  either  instances  of  technical  irruptions  from  within  the  operating  systems,  hardware  and  software  of  machines,  nor  of  either  ontological  or  communicative  noise,  but  of  labor.      Rosa  Menkman  (2010)  distinguishes  'hot'  and  'cool'  variants  of  glitch  as  deliberate  labor  on  the  image.  A  hot  glitch  focuses  on  producing  an  end  product  which  satisfies  some  aesthetic  criteria:  she  gives  the  example  of  Nabil  Elderkin's  2009  video  for  Kanye  West's  Welcome  to  Heartbreak.  Cool  glitch  is  a  process,  an  exploration.  The  taxonomy  sits  on  top  of  an  older  one  that  distinguishes  intentional  from  accidental,  where  the  intentional  is  ultimately  
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instrumental  while  the  accidental  involves  at  the  very  least  a  share  of  creativity  taken  up  by  either  natural  processes  or  technologies  or  both.  The  instrumental,  'hot'  glitch,  with  its  restriction  to  the  human,  is  a  work  in  which  work  itself  is  evaporated,  subsumed  into  intention,  while  excluding  also  the  labor  of  the  technology  (Marx's  'dead  labor')  and  of  natural  processes,  here  electricity  and  the  electro-­‐magnetic  spectrum.    In  Andrew  Norman  Wilson's  photographic  series  ScanOps  (2012)  which  reproduces  images  from  Google  Books'  vast  number  of  scans,  the  gloved  fingers  of  scan  operators  appear  in  frame,  evidence  of  repressed  human  labor  captured  in  the  massive  technological  apparatus  creating  the  world's  largest  library,  a  process  which  echoes  various  forms  of  errors,  including  images  of  animators'  and  technicians'  hands  in  carefully  observed  cartoons.  As  Hannah  Frank  writes,  'The  disturbing  presence  of  scratches,  stains,  and  grain—or  are  they  pen  strokes,  paint  splotches,  dust  specks?—do  not  occlude  the  object  but  instead  reveal  the  nexus  of  social,  technological,  and  economic  practices  that  is  the  photographic  apparatus.'  (Frank  2016).  The  surface  of  a  physical  photograph  is  vulnerable  to  the  grease  on  fingertips,  its  meniscus  marked  with  the  identity  of  those  who  have  touched  it.  A  digital  image  pretends  to  absolute  autonomy  from  its  making  and  its  passage  through  time.  By  excluding  itself  from  history  and  divorcing  itself  from  life,  it  aspires  to  the  purity  of  a  wholly  rational  existence.  But  if  it  were  possible  for  digital  images  truly  to  separate  themselves  so  absolutely  from  time,  they  would  be  empty.  This  is  indeed  a  possibility:  that  they  persist  not  as  images  but  as  code,  but  in  that  case  they  are  dependent  on  specific  software  for  their  display.  Glitch  denies  to  digital  artifacts  the  autonomy  that  would  destroy  them.  1This  contradiction  between  autonomy  and  
                                                            
1  At the same, as pure code, the digital image places itself in the domain of the absolute, to the extent that, 
under the terms of digital rationalism, nature has become data. In this moment, the image disavows its 
phenomenal form in order to become purely arithmetic. As numerical matrix, it replaces meaning with pattern, 
that is with an aesthetic no longer dependent on human interpretation but sui generis, by which should be 
understood both that it is of its own kind, autonomous of human knowing and, etymologically, that it is a self-
generating, automatic reflection of the essentially numeric structure of scientific measurement. This intrinsically 
invisible but also insensibly numerical absolute takes, for technological and more specifically digital rationalism the 
place of the void in, for example, the thought of Nishida (e.g. 1990). This void teeming with numerical and 
algorithmic auto-generative process is both nihil in that it has no being either in itself or for others, and at the same 
time plenum in that nothing else can co-exist with it. The necessarily iterative operation of natural laws in their 
algebraic form and the limited symbol set it draws on means that the wild processes are in themselves profoundly 
repetitive, and thus meaningless not only in the exclusion of semantic humanism but in relation to the death 
instinct. As intimated below, the mechanical repetition of factory discipline and its organization of labor as 
abstract simple labor power as exchange value align with repetition as symptom of thanatos. The arithmetic model 
of the universe in technological rationality is then structurally homologous with the formal properties of 
neoliberalism. Thus the more closely the data image approximates to pure abstraction, the more profoundly it 
becomes dependent on a specific social and political culture and its formal signature.  
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dependence  is  however  not  resolvable  in  a  synthesis  in  which  freedom  is  necessity.  Rather  the  two  co-­‐exist  in  the  mutual  antagonism  expressed  in  glitches.  Frank's  assemblage  of  practices  constantly  threatens  the  progress  of  digital  rationalism  towards  nothingness  through  a  glitch  that  turns  them  into  sites  in  which  they  work  and  are  worked  upon  by  human,  non-­‐human  and  no-­‐longer-­‐human  labor.      Since  the  technical  media,  from  clockwork  to  Herzian  clock  functions,  rely  on  repetition,  they  congeal  in  their  particular  assemblage  of  dead  labor  the  repetitions  of  natural  laws,  of  factory  discipline  and  of  the  death  instinct;  while,  in  Shannon  and  Weaver's  proto-­‐cybernetic  theory  of  communication,  repetition  is  a  form  of  noise  and  hence  of  entropy.  Thus  the  model  of  the  archive  as  site  of  eternal  repetition  of  the  same  allies  itself  with  a  necessarily  noise-­‐generating  and  entropic  system  which,  to  that  extent,  excludes  the  human  from  its  ideal  operation.  This  is  why  the  work  of  the  archive  always  interrupts  pure  repetition.  Glitches  disallow  any  purity  of  repetition,  which  would  erase  time  from  the  equation  of  one  repetition  with  another,  because  whether  they  arise  at  the  moment  of  representation,  of  storage  or  of  transmission,  glitches  are  always  temporal  phenomena.  Against  the  indifference  of  repetition  they  assert  'the  difference  that  makes  a  difference  in  a  later  state  of  affairs'  by  which  Bateson  defines  information.  Moreover,  glitches,  whatever  their  provenance,  are  also  phenomena  perceptible  to  the  three  phyla,  human,  machinic  and  natural.      In  this  they  differ  from  nature  as  it  exists  now  for  technical  purposes.  The  history  of  nature  as  concept  might  be  boldly  figured  as  transition  from  commons,  by  exclusion,  to  wilderness;  and  from  wilderness,  by  expropriation,  to  raw  material.  In  our  times  these  strata  persist  under  a  new  layer,  in  which  the  raw  material  has  acquired  the  characteristics  of  data.  If  on  the  one  hand  contemporary  environmentalism  strives  to  recover  the  polytheist  and  pantheist  relations  typical  of  the  oldest  strata,  nature  as  data  is  the  object  of  a  struggle  to  deliver  nature  from  the  monotheism  of  the  industrial  phase  when  nature  was  raw  material  and  inert,  and  seen  optimistically,  to  move  towards  a  secular  relation  in  which  nature  has  a  voice  of  its  own.  However,  the  model  that  has  grown  most  organically  from  the  earlier  strata  is  one  of  natural  communication,  rather  than  mediation.  As  communication,  the  data  of  nature  is  read  only  as  sending,  via  discrete  channels,  discrete  messages.  It  is  as  if  in  face-­‐to-­‐face  communication  the  only  information  was  the  words  spoken,  but  not  the  tone  of  voice,  the  facial  expressions  or  
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gestures,  the  multiple  interactions  with  the  interlocutor,  and  all  the  cultural  formations  of  the  individuals  and  the  event  –  location,  timing,  gender,  age  and  race,  styles  of  clothing,  acoustics  .  .  .    everything,  in  fact,  that  allows  mediation  to  occur  through  many  channels  and  with  multiple  connotations  affecting  both  partners  in  conversation  and,  in  many  instances,  accumulating,  in  the  place  where  the  conversation  happens,  to  produce  that  sense  of  place  we  encounter  intuitively  in  sites  of  long  inhabitance  and  significance  like  churches,  of  which  Augé  (1995)  has  written  so  eloquently  in  the  opening  pages  of  Non-­‐Places.  Stripped  of  their  materiality  and  reduced  to  words,  human  interactions  lose  their  complexity.  It  is  such  purely  symbolic,  abstracted  forms  of  communication  that  are  gathered  by  cookies  and  other  technologies  mapping  online  behaviors.  The  becoming-­‐data  of  nature  in  digital  reason2  strips  it  back  to  numerical  symbols.  The  pattern-­‐seeking  predisposition  of  digital  reason  leads,  in  a  second  stage,  towards  averaging  out  the  exceptional,  which  is  excluded  from  communication  under  the  label  of  noise.  As  a  general  rule  glitches  can  only  work  on  this  second  operation,  reasserting  the  numerically  exceptional3  in  order  to  reveal  the  normative  techniques  of  domination,  but  without  being  able  to  crack  open  or  sabotage  the  arithmeticization  on  which  it  is  founded.  To  the  extent  that  it  concerns  only  the  recording  of  the  numerical  measure  of  phenomena,  not  the  phenomena  themselves,  the  statistical  functioning  of  digital  reason  is  invisible  unless  actively  visualized,  unheard  unless  sonified.      This  is  why  the  perceptible  nature  of  audio  and  video  glitches  is  in  the  end  more  significant  than  simply  as  punctuations  of  norms.  Their  liminality  operates  between  the  smoothed  and  insensible  operation  of  numerical  code  and  the  eruption  of  code  into  sensation.  Not  itself  a  site  of  meaning,  the  glitch  exposes  the  lack  of  meaning  underneath  the  manipulated  symbols  constituting  not  only  digital  presentations  (films,  images,  music  .  .  .)  but  of  the  world,  the  human,  technical  and  natural  environments,  as  constituted  in  the  form  of  pure  data.  Nor  is  it  the  site  of  pure  difference,  from  which  meaning  might  arise.  On  the  contrary,  to  the  extent  that  digital  reason  runs  precisely  on  the  measurement  and  manipulation  of  difference,  the  glitch  reveals  the  pure  indifference  underpinning  the  logic  of  exchange  on  which  it  is  founded.  In  the  first  instance,  the  labor  of  the  glitch  is  legible  as  a  work  of  undoing  the  exchange  relation  as  it  
                                                            
2 Digital reason should be understood as the contemporary mutation of instrumental reason, which was the 
characteristic logic of technological rationality under conditions of industrialisation and mechanisation.  
3 In this glitch operates rather like certain forms of cultural studies, which seek out the exceptions from normative 
culture, those marginalised by gender, sexuality, ethnicity and so forth, in order to reveal the operation that 
marginalises them in its pursuit of an exclusive dominant cultural formation.   
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dominates  conceptions  of  digital  communication,  and  specifically  of  the  reduction  of  nature  to  communication  and  norm  in  digital  rationality.  In  the  second,  as  limen,  it  mines  the  rift  between  sensible  and  insensible  to  expose  the  indifference  on  which  their  distinction  is  based,  and  with  it  the  grounds  of  the  ascendency  of  abstraction  over  the  actual  in  the  operation  of  bio-­‐political  government.    As  labor,  glitch  operates  then  as  a  form  of  aletheia,  revealing,  that  reveals,  however,  not  being  but  indifference  in  the  threshold  between  perceptible  and  imperceptible4.  For  this  labor  to  be  worthwhile,  it  must  be  other  than  simple,  abstract  labor:  it  must  be  useful.  In  which  sense  then  is  glitch  useful?  Those  glitches  that  are  knowingly  produced,  that  is  whose  labor  is  specifically  human,  can  simply  emulate  accidental  glitches,  as  in  some  science  fiction  films.  Alternatively,  in  art  practice,  it  can  be  a  work  of  randomizing  as  deliberate  disruption,  which  in  at  least  some  cases  involves  choices  between  several  glitches  to  select  the  most  effective,  pleasing  or  otherwise  handy.  The  first  of  these  categories,  emulated  glitches,  are  undoubtedly  products  of  human  labor,  oriented  towards  signifying  even  if  they  seem  to  disrupt  signification.  They  foreground  the  work  of  mediation  in  the  diegetic  world  of  the  narrative,  proving  the  accuracy  of  their  representations  of  media  by  including  errors.  The  emulated  glitch  thus  extends  the  realist  project  that  seeks  to  persuade  audiences  of  the  materiality  of  the  world  they  see  represented.  In  the  second  category,  the  foregrounding  serves  as  interruption  of  exactly  this  realist  project,  but  is  nonetheless  also  human  work.  The  remaining  question  concerns  whether  the  accidental,  unplanned  glitch,  the  work  of  natural  or  technological  agency,  those  we  mostly  see  as  purely  accidental,  can  in  some  sense  be  said  to  involve  labor.        The  bulk  of  accidental  glitches  occur  in  the  working  life  of  media  artifacts  –  scratches  and  physical  imperfections  acquired  through  transmission  and  display  –  and  in  the  archive  –  
                                                            
4 In this it differs from the modes of breakdown analyzed by Dreyfus (1991: 70-73) in his account of the 'disturbance' or 
'breakdown' in Heidegger, who must always be evoked where aletheia is translated by 'revealing. In Dreyfus's 
reading, Heidegger's concern is the emergence of things from their transparency when their functioning is 
interrupted, hampered or stopped. The glitch is rather a distraction, in which a scar in the medium and corresponding 
scar in our attention to it are equally and speedily repaired, so that it is the repair rather than the fault that challenges 
the smooth operation of the communicative operation. At the same time, the glitch, situated between what we see 
and what we choose to ignore, is the irreducible difference within the flow of indifferent units of communication: 
successive frames, successive scan lines, successive commodities. To the extent that attention itself is labor and 
therefore also a commodity, the scarification of the always partial repair is also an interruption of the communicative 
labor that conforms subjectivity to the regime of exchange vale. 
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accumulations  of  the  dust  and  electro-­‐magnetic  scars.  We  think  of  exhibition  –  in  the  broad  sense  covering  all  audiovisual  media  –  as  a  showing  of  the  integral  work,  or  something  as  close  to  it  as  circumstances  allow;  and  of  the  archive  as  an  institution  dedicated  to  maintaining  that  integrity.  Actually  every  screening  places  demands  on  the  materials  involved,  including  digital  packages,  to  the  extent  that  lower-­‐quality  showprints  were  the  norm  in  the  celluloid  era,  while  the  maintenance  and  operation  of  projectors,  lenses  and  screens  today  is  often  marginalized  in  the  theatrical  cinema  business  and  even  in  art  world  exhibitions  of  video  and  audio.  Meanwhile,  every  archivist  knows  that  they  must  prioritize  available  funds  for  specific  projects,  abandoning  others  to  'the  gnawing  criticism  of  the  mice',  and  must  frequently  make  the  decision  to  abandon  the  historical  artifact  (celluloid,  tape,  file)  in  favor  of  digitized  documentation  of  it,  a  process  that  always  involves  not  only  loss,  but  the  creation  of  new  effects  occurring  at  the  interface  between  different  material  substrates,  formats,  operating  systems  and  codecs.  Many  of  these  effects  are  unwilled,  accidental,  and  unavoidable.  They  become  integral  to  the  new  form  archived  works  take,  just  as  conditions  of  screening  overdetermine  the  presentation  and  therefore  the  experience,  the  phenomenality,  of  film,  TV,  video  and  digital  visual  works.  As  Renate  Ferro  and  Timothy  Murray  suggest,  we  are  best  understanding  these  processes  in  terms,  deriving  ultimately  from  Freud,  of  a  work  of  forgetting  that  is  integral  to  the  work  of  remembering.  To  remember  is  always  to  recall  otherwise:  a  relationship  to  the  past  rather  than  a  more  or  less  accurate  statement  of  it,  arising  'from  within  the  legacy  of  ruptured  teleologies,  whether  the  forgetful  field  of  what  Derrida  understood  as  the  erasures  of  archival  fever,  or  from  what  Foucault  applauds  as  the  modifying  thickness  of  archival  accumulations'  (Ferro  and  Murray  2015:  80,  citing  Derrida  1995  and  Foucault  1972).  A  first  useful  labor  of  'accidental',  natural  and  technological  glitching  is  to  promote  forgetting,  and  to  integrate  forgetting  into  the  fabric  of  the  texts  and  objects  in  the  electronic  archive.    Writing  in  the  pages  of  the  review  Kasark  in  the  mid-­‐1950s,  the  Swedish  critic  and  curator  Pontus  Hultén  (cited  in  Andersson  et  al  2010:  94-­‐95)  believed  that  the  age  of  representation  was  over,  that  contemporary  art  had  to  present  itself  instead  as  object  in  the  world,  and  therefore  proposed  that  'chance  enters  as  a  symbol  for  the  tie  to  reality  in  which  contingency  rules'.  Reality  is  here  defined  as  the  zone  of  contingency,  which  has  the  double  weighting  in  English  of  randomness  and  of  being  contingent  upon,  that  is  of  being  caught  inside  causal  networks.  To  call  this  practice  'contingent'  has  the  double  sense  of  relinquishing  control  in  
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favor  of  accident,  and  at  the  same  time  permitting  natural  and  technical  processes  to  enter  into  the  creative  work  of  art-­‐making.  Secondly,  such  chance  procedures  are  points  of  entry,  in  which  chance  acts  as  symbol.  'There  is  no  model  for  the  one  who  is  seeking  that  which  he  has  never  seen.  The  pictures  that  are  symbols  for  the  reality  he  wants  to  construct  cannot  be  restricted  to  space  or  time.  The  symbols  for  his  freedom  have  to  be  even  more  liberated  than  he  himself  has  the  power  to  be'.  Hultén  embraced  cinema  as  he  did  kinetic  art  as  machines  which  already  are  capable  of  generating  symbols,  and  indeed  of  being  symbols  in  themselves  in  their  entanglement  in  chains  of  contingent  causes  and  effects.  Their  strength  is  not  only  that  they  are  autonomous  of  institutional,  or  indeed  of  human  constraints,  but  that  that  autonomy  allows  them  to  act  as  symbols;  that  is  as  things  which  act  back  on  the  human,  but  from  outside  it.  This  reciprocity  between  human  and  non-­‐human  actors  is  a  distinctive  feature  of  modern  art,  which  began  to  incorporate  real  objects  in  the  place  of  representing  already  before  WWI,  during  which  conflict  however  collages  of  found  objects  began  to  crack  open  the  civilizational  claims  of  the  representational.  At  the  same  time,  cinema  operated  as  a  system  for  discovering  found  objects  ('scenes')  and  montage  a  means  for  constructing  alterity  from  the  ostensibly  integral  moments  seized  in  the  shot:  a  system  for  revivifying  the  symbolic  order  of  industrial  modernity  by  using  its  own  technical  dispositif  to  create  means  for  extra-­‐human  intervention  in  the  processes  of  meaning-­‐making.      What  results  is  an  unsettling  of  the  work,  'definitively  unfinished'  as  Duchamp  is  said  to  have  remarked  of  the  Large  Glass  after  its  cracking.  Or  as  Ryszard  Kluszczynski  (2007:  223)  says  of  hypertext,  'the  ultimate  object  of  analysis  is  not  the  work  itself  .  .  .  but  the  field  of  interactive  artistic  communication,  where  the  work,  along  with  other  elements  (the  artist,  the  recipient/interactor,  the  artifact,  the  interface)  becomes  entangled  in  an  intricate,  multidimensional  complex  of  communication  processes'.  What  in  Duchamp  is  still  an  authorial  statement,  subordinating  technical  and  natural  processes  to  the  overarching  control  of  the  artist,  moves  in  Pontén  to  a  liberation  of  the  artist  from  himself.  In  hypertext,  as  Kluszczynski  sees  it,  a  further  step  liberates  the  artwork  from  that  very  object  status  which,  for  Hultén,  was  the  means  to  human  liberation.  Kluszczynski  marks  the  integration  of  the  artifact  and  the  interface  –  its  infrastructural  technologies  –  into  creation;  what  remains  to  be  undertaken  is  the  integration  of  nature.  Yet  Kluszczynski  is  correct  in  implying  that  the  resulting  communicative  nexus  is  not  in  fact  integrated  into  an  artistic.  Instead  it  completes  the  move  from  representation  to  presentation  by  alleviating  the  work  of  the  burden  of  
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presence.  We  have  only  to  add  the  action  of  air,  dust,  ambient  daylight,  exhibition  acoustics,  machine  noise,  molds,  microbes  to  begin  to  understand  the  full  complexity  of  the  unintegrated  work  as  work  continuously  undertaken  by  multiple  agencies.  The  accidental  glitch  operates  in  this  becoming  of  the  work.  It  acts  in  those  works  that  do  present  themselves  as  both  authorial  and  complete  to  indicate  that  neither  attribute  is  stable:  that  it  is  not  only  the  human  interpreter  who  is  active  in  the  art  experience  but  the  work  too.      At  the  same  time  it  is  worth  noting,  against  the  argument  made  in  this  paper,  Wolfgang  Ernst's  warning  that    the  unexpected  corresponds  to  the  disturbance  that  is  television  proper:  the  paradoxical  structure  of  the  medium  demands  extraordinary  events  that  can  appear  only  within  the  ever-­‐same  schematics;  live  broadcast  would  then  be  the  condition  of  possibility  of  disrupting  an  otherwise  imperturbably  streaming  flow.  .  .  .  It  is  precisely  [such  disturbances']  exhibition  within  their  own  genre  that  makes  the  paradox  of  television  as  a  medium  apparent:  constantly  having  to  provide  the  unexpected  (Ernst  2012:  105-­‐6).  Television,  especially  in  its  broadcast  form,  like  Kluszczynski's  hypertext,  is  not  an  object  but  a  communicative  nexus,  and  yet  one  that  is  dedicated  to  homeostatic  regulation  of  difference.  In  the  authoritative  mode  of  broadcasting,  in  which  continuous  transmission  takes  precedence  over  all  other  priorities,  the  glitch  provides  evidence  of  the  ongoing  event  of  television:  even  in  its  failure,  TV  manages  to  continue.  Like  candid  and  fortuitous  events  caught  by  cameras,  glitches  consolidate  the  ideology  of  realism  and  liveness  on  which  broadcast  transmission  depends.  It  carries  on  through  the  glitches,  assimilating  them  into  its  regime  of  onward  flow  and  indifferent  differences.  The  art  world  is  even  more  devoted  to  shocks  and  innovations,  all  of  which  function  smoothly  within  the  ever-­‐expanding  sphere  of  art's  sophistication,  its  ability  to  assimilate  n'importe  quoi.  The  disruptions  themselves  are  part  of  the  continuity,  the  homogeneity  of  art,  broadcast  and  biopolitical  culture  generally.      This  is  the  point  at  which  Hultén's  insistence  on  the  symbol  becomes  invaluable.  For  Ernst,  machine  recording,  uninhibited  by  human  listening's  focus  on  semantics,  embraces  noise,  but  
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does  so  first  as  index  (there  is  a  referent)  and  second  as  meaningful  within  the  regime  of  the  machine's  'interests'.  For  Ernst  this  is  evidence  of  a  rupture  between  human  and  machinic  perception,  human  and  machinic  time.  Hultén's  symbol,  etymologically  the  'thrown  together',  indicates  on  the  contrary  the  simultaneity  of  distraction  in  glitches  which,  as  traces,  marr  the  smoothness  and  reveal  the  alterity  within  indifferent  flows.  The  symbol  is  not  a  signifier,  locked  into  a  human  lexicon  and  grammar  and  severed  from  its  referent  or  even  its  semantic  signified.  A  symbol,  as  Hultén  proposes  it,  is  the  privileged  technical  and  material  form  marking  the  passage  between  non-­‐human  to  human.  As  long  as  a  glitch  can  be  treated  as  a  signifier,  it  can  be  assimilated  in  the  manner  Ernst  analyses.  But  as  symbol,  to  the  extent  that  it  marks  the  threshold  between  human  and  non-­‐human,  contingent  reality  and  system  of  signification,  it  is  capable  of  the  kind  of  liberating  autonomy  Hultén  celebrated,  and  which  forms  an  integral  part  of  the  ontology  of  audiovisual  media  and  the  media  arts5.      The  symbol  belongs  not  to  the  presence  of  the  work,  nor  even  to  its  becoming,  but  to  its  latency.  In  wet  photography,  the  latent  image  is  the  state  of  the  exposed  frame  prior  to  fixing,  which  acts  as  a  chemical  amplification  of  the  initially  very  small  number  of  reactions  triggered  by  light  reaching  the  negative.  The  parallel  in  digital  photography  is  the  stage  between  the  accumulation  of  charge  on  the  exposed  chip  and  its  amplification,  digitization  and  removal  into  storage.  In  computer  systems  more  generally,  latency  is  the  time  taken  to  relocate  any  item  of  data,  such  as  the  time  it  takes  to  download,  or  to  access  a  file  from  a  hard  drive.  As  the  temporal  dimension  in  any  retrieval,  including  the  retrieval  of  the  effects  of  light  through  the  chains  of  post-­‐exposure  procedures  in  wet  or  digital  imaging,  latency  parallels  the  time  of  perception,  which  is  always  in  hock  to  its  pasts.  Symbols  are  always  irruptions  into  the  past  of  a  lexicon  that  bring  with  it  evidence  of  its  externalities.  Among  those  externalities,  the  temporality  of  perception  draws  on  both  remembrance  and  forgetting,  misremembering  and  misforgetting.  The  glitches  of  memory  defer  and  disorient  when  they  drag  up  the  unrecalled,  in  the  manner  of  Freudian  slips,  jokes  and  dreams.  Such  glitches  may  perhaps  draw  on  upwellings  of  the  animal  nature  in  humans,  as  accidents  in  language  and  signifying  systems.  
                                                            
5 It is possible that media arts are distinguishable from contemporary art by their surrender of agency to non-human 
forces; and by their commitment to working within certain frames of materiality (film, video, network). 
Contemporary art of the n'importe quoi celebrates indifference as the summum bonum of pointlessly proliferated 
difference. It is the perfect market, in which anything can be exchanged under the token of universal uniqueness – in 
this the high-cultural expression of the same cultural configuration as Facebook. Media arts, with the respect for 
materials art abandoned along with modernism, foregrounds the commonality of its frames and supports – screens, 
interfaces, code – in order to propose a commons unavailable to the exchange structure of contemporary art, which 
can only imitate it, as in Bourriaud's (2002) relational aesthetic. 
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They  also  drag  back,  deformed,  the  externalized,  repressed  histories,  the  'emotional  and  cognitive  costs',  that  Nandy  insists  lie  buried  in  histories  of  colonialism.  To  break  the  unity  of  the  screen-­‐image  system  through  the  materiality  of  segmented  flow  is  the  revenge  of  the  rationalized  on  their  rational  progenitor.      The  glitches  we  are  seeking  out  here,  those  stemming  from  technical  and  natural  processes,  are  also  upwellings  of  externalities.  As  deeply  repressed  as  human  affects  and  ideas  are  the  lands  conquered  and  despoiled  in  colonialism,  including  the  colonization  of  the  commons  in  primitive  accumulation,  and  the  machineries  of  domination,  from  navies  to  weapons,  railways  to  accounting  tools.  Those  technologies  that  have  become  second  nature,  whose  existence  is  so  deeply  embedded  we  no  longer  perceive  them,  return  in  their  malfunctioning  the  evidence  of  their  ongoing  exploitation,  as  the  repression  of  the  colonized  returns  in  racist  'jokes'  and  pornography,  or  reversed  in  sports  fandom  and  identification  with  film  and  music  stars.  Technologies  are  similarly  thematized  in  contemporary  film  and  television,  but  equally  rarely  are  the  media  technologies  invited  to  participate  in  the  production  of  the  audiovisual  except  as  the  unseen  supports,  the  screens  through  which  we  look  rather  than  active  participants  in  the  production  of  signs.  Glitches  like  dead  pixels  or  the  stutter  of  scratched  optical  media  not  only  foreground  the  technical  infrastructure  but  intervene  in  the  production  of  signification.    It  is  important  then  to  recognize  in  Hultén's  symbol  that  signification,  if  it  occurs  at  all,  is  an  epiphenomenon  of  its  activity.  The  symbol  is  an  act.  It  has  material  consequences.  A  glitch  in  code,  whether  its  source  is  human  error,  natural  contingency  or  technical  artifact,  changes  the  performance  of  the  program:  is  performative.  It  is  a  kind  of  feedback  loop  stitching  together  the  repressed  past  with  the  future  of  the  unfolding  signification  and  communication  process.  It  is  in  this  respect  the  emergence  of  mediation  within  communication,  where  mediation  is  the  primal  connectivity  of  everything,  and  communication  the  reduction  of  mediation  for  purposes  of  control  (survival  and  domination).  At  the  same  time  it  indicates  a  concatenation  of  human  and  non-­‐human  action,  the  conditions  for  the  existence  of  useful  labor  in  Marx.  To  the  extent  that  the  contemporary  Market  is  integrally  communicative,  the  a-­‐signifying  glitch,  as  symbol,  is  not  so  much  a  containable  irrationality  but  an  a-­‐rational  exception  that  disproves  the  principle  of  rule.  To  the  extent  that  contemporary  communication  is  enfolded  in  the  operations  of  Market  rationality,  the  a-­‐subjective  glitch  is  counterfoil  to  the  Market  as  
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Subject.    In  this  it  is  rather  more  than  sabotage,  rather  more  than  a  disruption  of  domination  that,  despite  itself,    remains  dependent  on  domination.  Coming  from  externalities,  a-­‐subjective,  a-­‐communicative  but  nonetheless  mediating  glitches  mediate  between  the  dominated  and  the  autonomous  orders  created  by  the  twin  processes  of  environmentalization  and  externalization.  For  Negri,  'the  common  is  that  which  distinguishes'  (Negri  2008:  162,  original  emphasis).  Contra  the  idea  of  a  global  commons  which  belongs  to  all,  Negri's  formulation  allows  us  to  recognize  claims  to  differential  access:  indigenous  claims  to  specific  places,  claims  for  certain  territories  to  marked  as  out  of  bounds  to  humans.  It  also  promotes  difference  as  the  useful,  as  opposed  to  the  indifferent  regime  of  exchange  value.  Negri  continues:  'Language  and  cooperation  have  to  contain  within  them  a  break  at  the  level  of  practice,  an  ongoing  affirmation  of  the  centrality  of  common  practice,  which  means  a  concrete  conjoining  of  knowledge  and  action  within  these  processes'  (Negri  2008:  162,  original  emphasis).  If  we  understand  his  premise  to  apply  also  to  media,  which  are  not  exclusively  human,  then  the  common  practice  must  also  contain  the  natural  and  technological,  which  can  no  longer  be  abstracted  as  environments  and  externalities  from  the  human  polis  but  must  be  recognized  as  having  their  own  claims  to  act  and  to  labor  towards  producing  the  common,  even  as  their  actions  produce  differentiations  within  the  common.      Phenomenologically,  the  glitch  removes  intention  from  the  pair  retention  and  protention  with  which  Husserl  (1983:  175)  marked  human  perception  as  irrevocably  temporal.  As  a-­‐subjective  acts,  glitches  do  not  intend.  Yet  in  evacuating  intention  from  the  flow  of  signification,  accidental  and  a-­‐subjective  glitches  not  only  undermine  the  intentionality  of  instrumental  communication  but  replace  it  with  another  logic  which  belongs  to  the  autonomous  interactions  of  the  common  rather  than  to  the  freedom  claimed  for  its  actants  by  the  Market.      Therefore  as  a  preliminary  conclusion,  while  some  glitches  operate  within  existing  regimes  of  signification,  a-­‐subjective,  unintentional,  accidental  glitches  are  symbolic  acts  which  work  towards  the  common,  that  is  a  renewed  mode  of  mediation  engaging  human,  natural  and  
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